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Abstract In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy
in lieu of the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for
this move is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current
and future campaigns. This paper investigates the optimality of the 50-state strategy in
a simple dynamic game of campaign resource allocation in which expenditures act as a
form of investment. Neither the 50-state nor the battleground-states strategy is likely to
arise in equilibrium. Instead, parties employ a modiﬁed battleground-states strategy in
which they stochastically target non-battleground states.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, C7
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of Attrition3
1 Introduction
One of the deﬁning attributes of Howard Dean’s leadership of the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) is the 50-state strategy. In essence, the 50-state strategy commits
campaign resources to all 50 states rather than concentrating on only the swing or bat-
tleground states. This strategy is not without critics. In fact, both the Democratic Con-
gressional Campaign Committee and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
openly opposed the 50-state strategy (see Bai (2006), Edsell (2006), Gilgoff(2006)).
Even after the large Democratic gains in the 2006 midterm elections this strategy has
drawn criticism (see Lizza (2006)). This paper utilizes a simple dynamic game of cam-
paign resource allocation to analyze both sides of the controversy surrounding this strat-
egy.
The rationale typically given for the 50-state strategy is that campaign expenditures
are durable outlays which impact not only the current campaign but also strengthen the
party in future campaigns. As stated by Dean in a 2006 e-mail sent to Democrats na-
tionwide,1 “our 50-state strategy has already laid a nationwide foundation for victory
this year, in 2008 and beyond.” To illustrate the intuitively appealing logic of this strat-
egy, consider for example a race in which the democratic candidate has little chance of
winning. If current campaign expenditures persist into future campaigns, then commit-
ting resources to such a race may indeed be optimal, even if the candidate goes on to
lose the race, since the expenditure is an investment that will help make that race more
competitive in the future.
Opponents of the 50-state strategy argue that races in which the democratic candi-
date is either a strong favorite or a strong underdog have essentially been decided (won
and lost respectively), and campaign resources will only have an impact, and therefore
should only be committed, in the swing or battleground races (battleground-states strat-
egy). According to this line of reasoning, the 50-state strategy is clearly suboptimal in
a one-shot environment or in the absence of persistent campaign expenditures. Remark-
ably, critics of the strategy appear to argue that the 50-state strategy is suboptimal even
if intertemporal considerationsare taken into account. As stated by Rep. Rahm Emanuel
(Ill.), Chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee for the 2006 elec-
tion cycle, “The way you build long-term is to succeed short-term.” (Edsell 2006)
1 This e-mail appears in its entirety on the DNC’s website,
www.democrats.org/a/2006/06/50-state_strate_1.php.4
To examineboth sidesof thecontroversysurroundingthe50-statestrategy,thispaper
utilizes a simple two-period campaign resource allocation game in which campaign
expenditures in the ﬁrst period state contests serve as a form of investment with beneﬁts
that persist into the second period contests. The game has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium, in which parties employ nondegenerate mixed local strategies in each state
in each period.
In the second (ﬁnal) period, subgame equilibria are consistent with a modiﬁed
battleground-statesstrategyinwhichswingstatesarehotlycontested,butpartiesstochas-
tically target non-battleground states, each allocating zero resources to a state with a
probability that increases with the strength of the incumbent party in that state and
decreases in the value of the state. Although the investment effect leads to increased
effective stakes for the ﬁrst period contests, equilibrium ﬁrst period strategies are still
consistent with a modiﬁed battleground-states strategy in which non-battleground states
are stochastically targeted.
Because parties randomize in each state in each period, we may compute an explicit
probability that a 50-state strategy will be followed by either party in either period.
Although, under our assumptions, this probability is non-zero, it will generally be quite
small. We conclude that a 50-state strategy is unlikely to be optimal.
2 Related Literature
This paper extends Snyder’s (1989) static analysis of campaign resource allocation2
to examine the nature of the incentives arising in an intertemporal model of campaign
resource allocation with persistent campaign expenditures that act as a form of invest-
ment. That paper models a static campaign between two political parties competing in
a set of independent, simultaneous, and probabilistic contests (with a contest success
function adapted from Rosen (1986)). Under a probabilistic contest success function,
the party that allocates an effectively higher level of resources in a particular state has
a higher probability of winning that state but does not win with certainty. Within each
period, our formulation of the political campaign resource allocation game differs from
Snyder (1989) in that the competition within each state is assumed to be deterministic.
(More formally, we utilize an all-pay auction contest success function with afﬁne hand-
2 See Robson (2005) and Str¨ omberg (2008) for a closely related games. See also the
early contributions of Brams and Davis (1973,1974) and Colantoni, Levesque, and Or-
deshook (1975).5
icapping.) That is, the party that allocates the effectively higher level of resources to a
particular state wins that state with certainty. Our use of a deterministicsuccess function
is motivated by its analytical appeal and its widespread use in political applications in-
cluding the literatures on political lobbying (for a recent example see Polborn (2006)),
political campaigns (see for example Meirowitz (2008)), and redistributive competition
(see for example the literature following Myerson (1993)).
Ourresult isalso relevantto thetheoretical literatureondynamiccontests.In thecon-
text of a contest, the term “dynamic” covers a wide range of potential approaches. In the
single contest environment, dynamic games of sunk investment allowing for simultane-
ous moves have been examined by Harris and Vickers (1987), Budd, Harris and Vickers
(1993), Fudenberg et al. (1983), Klumpp and Polborn (2006), Konrad and Kovenock
(2005, 2006), McAfee (2000) and Agastya and McAfee (2006).3 Most of these papers
examine what in the Harris-Vickers taxonomy of dynamic structures would be called
either a “race” or a “tug-of-war” in which the contestants compete over a single prize.
Moreclosely related to ourformulationis Mehlumand Moene(2007)who alsoexamine
a dynamic model with incumbency advantages in which the status of incumbent may
change from period to period depending on the outcomeofeach period’s contest.4 How-
ever, in contrast to this paper, Mehlum and Moene (2007) examine a game in which the
incumbency advantage is exogenous.5 In our formulation the incumbency advantage is
endogenously determined by persistent campaign expenditures. In particular, we allow
for a portion of the campaign expenditures in each state to persist into the subsequent
period with a proportional decay. This formulation of persistent campaign expenditures
is reminiscent of the role of advertising as a form of investment in the optimal advertis-
3 In the single contest environment alternating move models of sunk expenditure fol-
lowing and expanding upon the logic of the Shubik (1971) “Dollar Auction Game”
have been examined by O’Neill (1986), Leininger (1989, 1991), and Demange (1992).
(Closely related is Harris and Vickers’ (1985) single dimensional alternating move
model of a race.) Multidimensional versions of these types of games have been ex-
amined by Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2006a,b) and applied to the issue of vote
buying.
4 See also Konrad (2006), Polborn (2006), and Stephan and Ursprung (1998) who ex-
aminemodelsinwhichachallengerrepeatedlyattacksanincumbentuntiltheincumbent
loses, at which point the game ends.
5 That paper also utilizes a probabilistic contest success function and focuses on a
single contest in each period.6
ing literature.6 Our paper extends the dynamic simultaneous–movecontest literature by
providing an intertemporal contest framework that allows for expenditures to be durable
outlays. In this setting we ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst period of the model, the incentives arising
from the persistence of contest expenditures induces an extension of the combination
all-pay auction/war of attrition (Hirshleifer and Riley (1978) and Riley (1998)).
Section 3 presents the two-stage intertemporal political campaign resource alloca-
tion game. Section 4 characterizes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the in-
tertemporal game and explores the properties of the equilibrium in each stage. Section
5 concludes.
3 The Model
We examine a two-stage intertemporal campaign resource allocation game in which in
each stage t = 1,2, as in the static analysis of Snyder (1989), two parties, A and B,
simultaneously allocate costly campaign resources across the individual states. There
are n states which are indexed by j = 1,...,n. Each state is won by the party that runs
the most effective campaign. The value of winning the campaign in state j is denoted
by vj. Two possible objectives for the parties include: (1) maximizing the expected sum
of the payoffs from each of the state campaigns and (2) maximizing the probability of
winning a majority of the available payoffs. Due to the fact that with a deterministic
success function and a ﬁnite number of states the solution to the majority objective is
still an open question,7 we restrict our attention to the ﬁrst of these objectives which is
consistent with a proportional system in which the parties share power in proportion to
the value of the states in which they win.
In addition to the set of state valuations {vj}n
j=1, each state has an incumbent party
with a potential investment advantage that is determined by campaign expenditures in
the prior period. Let N t
i denote the set of states in which party i is the incumbent in
period t. The investment advantage is modeled as a head-start advantage. Let at
j ≥ 0
6 To the best of our knowledge this literature originates with Nerlove and Arrow
(1962). For a survey see Feichtinger, Hartl, and Sethi (1994). For a recent application
see Marinelli (2007).
7 See for example Szentes and Rosenthal (2003) which examines the all-pay auction
by committee problem with a super-majority rule which requires a player to win n−1
of n contests each with equal value. See also Van Cayseele, Deneckere, and de Vries
(2001) which examines a version of this game which requires unanimity.7
denote the head-start advantage in state j in period t; at
j represents the number of units
of the campaign resource that the challenging party in state j must spend in period t
in order to make voters indifferent between the two parties when the incumbent party
spends zero units of the resource in state j in period t.
The state of the campaign game, denoted by St, is given by the stage t and the in-




i }i∈{A,B}}. In period 2 the investmentadvantage is a function of the two
parties’ period 1 campaign expenditures. Figure 1 illustrates the investment advantage
dynamics. Let I denote the incumbent party and C the challenging party in state j in
period t. If the incumbent party allocates xt
j,I resources to campaigning in state j in
period t, then the incumbent’s effective campaign expenditure in state j is xt
j,I +at
j. If
the challenging party allocates xt
j,C resources to campaigning in state j in period t, then
the challenger’s effective campaign expenditure in state j is xt
j,C. Each state is won by
the party that runs the most effective campaign. Thus, the incumbent party I wins the





In this case, the party that is the state j incumbent in period 1 will remain the incumbent
in period 2, and the investment effect in period 2 is deﬁned as a proportion of the dif-
ference between the incumbent’s expenditure in state j in period 1 minus the effective






where r ∈ (0,1] is the constant per period rate of decay of prior period’s effective ex-






In this case, the party that is the state j challenger in period 1 will become the incum-
bent in period 2, and the investment effect in period 2 is deﬁned as a proportion of the






where again r is the constant per period rate of decay of prior period’s effective expen-
ditures.8
[Insert Figure 1]
Although we have assumed that the investment advantage is a linear handicap, this
type of effectiveness advantage dates back to Lein (1990) and is frequently used in the
literature on unfair contests (see for instance: Clark and Riis (2000), Konrad (2002),
Meirowitz (2008), Polborn (2006), and Sahuguet and Persico (2006)). In order to high-
light the basic incentives driving the campaign investment dynamics, we have also ab-
stracted from any additional sources of incumbency advantage.
The parties maximize the sum of the discounted payoffs across the two periods,
where d ∈ (0,1) denotes the common discount factor employed by the two parties. The
payoff in a given period is the expected sum of the values of the states won net of the
expected campaign expenditures. In maximizing the intertemporal payoffs, the parties
take into account that the ﬁrst period’s expenditures are durable outlays which generate
the investment effect described above. Our focus on two periods is motivated by two
factors. First is the observation that on average the national committee chairs of both
of the major political parties serve for two election cycles.8 Throughout its history the
DNC has only had 7, out of a total of 50, chairs who served for more than 4 years.9
The Republican National Committee has only had 3, out of a total of 62, chairs serve
for more than 4 years.10 Given the short tenure of most national committee chairs this
seems like a reasonable modeling choice. Second, our two-period model is the simplest
possible setup that allows us to examine how the persistence of campaign expenditures
changes the nature of campaign resource allocation.11
We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game. The
equilibrium behavior strategy proﬁles require non-degenerate randomization at each
stage. A local strategy, which we label a campaign resource schedule for party i, is
8 The average tenure for the Republican National Committee Chair is 3.02 years and
for the Democratic National Committee Chair is 3.40 years.
9 The last one was Robert S. Strauss who served from 1972 to 1977.
10 The last one was Marcus A. Hanna who served from 1896 to 1904.
11 While not usually given as an argument for the 50-states strategy, our analysis also
abstracts from the issue of endogenous budget constraints. It is important to note that
the results of the one-shot game remain largely unchanged if the objective of each party
is to maximize the sum of the payoffs from each of the state campaigns subject to a bud-
get constraint. (See for example Kovenock and Roberson (2008), Kvasov (2007), and
Roberson (2006) who examine the role of budget constraints in simultaneous contests.)9
a set of cumulative distribution functions, {Ft
j,i}n
j=1, one distribution function for each
state j, which depends on the state St. The only restriction that is placed on the set of
feasible strategies is that each state must receive a nonnegative amount of campaign
resources.
We make the following assumptions on the rate of decay r, the discount factor d,
and the initial state of the game S1.
Assumption 1 In S1, a1
j < vj for all states j.
Assumption1 rules out cases in which the initial incumbency advantages in one or more
of the states are so large that the challenger optimally drops out of the race in period 1.
Assumption 2 The rate of decay r and the discount factor d satisfy 1
1+d > r.
Assumption 2 rules out cases in which it is optimal for the incumbent to make a period
1 campaign expenditure that is so large that the resulting period 2 investment advantage
induces the challenger to drop out of the race in period 2.
4 Optimal Strategies
We begin our analysis in the ﬁnal stage and move back through the game tree. The
period 2 equilibrium campaign resource schedules are given in Theorem 1. We intially
restrict our attention to the case in which a2
j < vj for all states j, and then show that
given Assumption 2, this holds in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 1 In period 2 with state of the game S2 such that a2
j < vj for all j, the unique
subgameNash equilibriumisforeach partyitochoosethefollowingcampaignresource































In equilibrium, party A’s period 2 payoff is åj∈N 2
A a2




See Konrad (2002) for a discussion of the single state case of Theorem 1. The proof
of uniqueness follows from Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1996).
The equilibrium strategies given in Theorem 1 appear to conform to the standard
short-run electoral gains arguments against the 50-state strategy. In each state both the
advantaged and disadvantagedparties rationally forgo allocating resources with positive
probability (aj/vj) and the more advantaged or disadvantaged a party is in a given state
the more likely that party is to forgo allocating resources to that state. This is essentially
a stochastic guerilla warfare strategy. The challenger has incentive to concede the state
and allocate zero resources with positive probability. However, when the challenger
contests the state he randomizes over the same effective support as the incumbent. Con-
versely, the incumbent knowing that the challenger will concede the state with positive
probability, optimally chooses to leave the state undefended (allocate zero resources)
with positive probability and to rely only on the built-up investment advantage.
Observethat each party’s period 2 payoffdepends critically on the outcomein period
1. In particular, each party only receives a positive expected payoff from the states in
which the party is the incumbent and carries over a positive investment advantage from
period 1. In the states in which a party is the challenger, the expected payoff is zero.
Additionally, for the incumbent the expected payoff is exactly equal to the built-up
investment advantage.
We now solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium local strategies in the ﬁrst period,
which are unique for a given initial state S1.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. In the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium local strategies in the ﬁrst period each party i chooses the following campaign
resource schedules:
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In equilibrium, party A’s total payoff is åj∈N 1
A [a1
j +(a1
j)2(dr/vj)] and party B’s total




Proof For the proof that these strategies form the unique ﬁrst-stage local strategies of a
subgame perfect equilibrium, we begin by establishing the payoffs that result from fol-
lowing the equilibriumstrategies in each period. Then, applying the one-stage-deviation
principle for ﬁnite horizon games, we move on to the examination of deviations from
the supports of the equilibrium strategies in period 1, given the (unique) induced equi-
librium strategies in period 2. The proof of uniqueness of the ﬁrst-stage strategies is
given in the appendix. Let pt
i denote the payoff to player i in period t.
Suppose that in period 1 and state S1 player i uses the equilibrium strategy. We show
that if player −i uses any pure strategy x1
−i|S1 in period 1 that is contained in his equi-










From Theorem 1 we know that in each state j the period 2 payoff is 0 for the chal-
lenger and a2
j for the incumbent. It follows directly that the payoff from winning state j
in period 1 is equal to the value of state j plus the discounted expected value from being






j is the induced investment
advantage carried over from the ﬁrst period.
Suppose player A follows his equilibrium strategy in period 1 and that both players
conform to their equilibrium strategies in period 2 given the resulting state S2. If player
B uses any pure strategy contained in the support of the period 1 equilibrium local



































































The ﬁrst two summands on the right-hand side of this equation represent party B’s ex-
pected winningsin thestatesin which party B is intiallytheincumbent,whilethesecond
two summands represent party B’s expected winnings from states in which B is initially
the challenger. The ﬁnal term is the total cost of party B’s campaign expenditures in
period 1.12
Ifparty B is initiallytheincumbentin state j, j ∈N 1
B , and party B winsthecampaign





j,A).Similarly,ifpartyBisinitiallythechallengerinstate j, j / ∈N 1
B ,
and party B wins the campaign in period 1, then the investment advantage that party B


















































































To complete the proof of the theorem, we now show that neither player can increase
his expected payoff by unilaterally deviating to an expenditure off of the equilibrium
support (given in (1)) in period 1, given the resulting subgame equilibrium arising in
period 2.
To demonstrate this, we break down the examination of potential deviations into two
parts: (i) deviations above the upper bound of the support that are small enough that
the period 1 margin of victory does not induce the challenger to drop out of the race in
period 2, and (ii) deviations above the upper bound that are sufﬁciently large that the
challenger is induced to drop out in period 2.
We begin with case (i). In order for the challenger to not drop out of the race in
period 2, it must be the that a2
j < vj. (Note that if S1 satisﬁes assumptions 1 and 2
and both players are following the equilibrium strategy in period 1 then a2
j < vj with
certainty.12) Thus, in case (i) the relevant payoff to check is given by equation (3).
From (3) it follows that in any state j in which party i is the incumbent in period 1
player i’s expected payoff in state j from using any pure strategy x1
j.i|S1 contained in the
12 In particular, if both players are following the equilibrium strategy then the maximal
value of the period 2 investment advantage, denoted a2
j, occurs at the point at which
the period 1 challenger allocates zero resources and the incumbent allocates an amount13
support of the equilibrium strategy in period 1 is
Ej(p1
i )+dEj(p2

































vj ))]. If player i chooses a pure strategy above the
upper bound of the support of the equilibrium strategy in some state j (and this strategy
results in a2
j < vj) then F1
j,−i(x1
j,i+a1
j) = 1 and from (4) player i’s expected payoff in
state j is less than a1
j +(a1
j)2(dr/vj), i.e., the payoff from not deviating from the sup-
port. A similar result applies to states in which party i is the challenger, establishing that
no player i has an incentive to deviate from the support of the equilibrium strategy if the
deviation does not induce the period 2 challenger to drop out of the race.
In case (ii), the margin of victory in period 1 is large enough (this condition is given
by a2
j > vj) that the challenger drops out of the race in period 2. We will now show
that this case is ruled out if S1 satisﬁes Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 holds. Observe











j. At a minimum, for the margin of victory to





The payoff to the incumbent from choosing a pure strategy in period 1 which induces
the challenger to drop out of the race in period 2 is equal to the value of winning the
state in period 1 plus the discounted value of winning the state in period 2 minus the
period 1 expenditurevj+dvj−x1
j,i. For thistobe aproﬁtablestrategyit mustbethecase
that this payoff is greater than the equilibrium payoff in this state a1
j +(a1
j)2(dr/vj).





j. The following condition rules out the possibility that any case
































but from assumption 2 it follows that a2
j < vj.14
Clearly this condition holds under Assumption 2 ( 1
1+d > r). A similar result applies in
the case that player i is the challenger in period 1.
This completes the proof that the strategies given in Theorem 2 form a subgame
perfect equilibrium. The proof of uniqueness is given in the appendix. ⊓ ⊔
The intuition for Theorem 2 is straightforward. In period 1 each party’s resource
allocation impacts not only the current campaign but also the subsequent campaign.
The strategic differences between periods 1 and 2 may be interpreted as reﬂecting the
differences between midterm and presidential election cycles. In this context, the period
1 strategy coincides with a midterm campaign strategy that uses current expenditures
to make an investment in the upcoming presidential campaign. Similarly, the period 2
strategy may be interpreted as a presidential campaign strategy of cashing-in on the
built-up investment advantages. Clearly, these additional strategic considerations result
in discrepancies between optimal short- and long-run campaign strategies.
More formally, the strategic difference between periods 1 and 2 corresponds directly
to the difference between the all-pay auction and the combination all-pay auction/war
of attrition. In the all-pay auction, each bidder submits a bid, the high bid wins, and all
bids are forfeited. The combination all-pay auction/war of attrition differs in that the
bidders care not only about winning but also the margin of victory. In particular, for
a two-player combination all-pay auction/war of attrition with a common prize worth





v−xi+b(xi−x−i) if xi > x−i ≥ 0
−xi if x−i > xi ≥ 0
v
2 −xi if xi = x−i ≥ 0
The equilibrium strategies in period 1 correspond directly to an extension of the combi-
nation all-pay auction/war of attrition, examined earlier by Hirshleifer and Riley (1978)
and Riley (1998), to allow for discrimination, in the form a head-start advantage, on
the part of the auctioneer. Thus, in period 1, or the midterm election cycle, the parties
take into account the margin of victory and its impact on the build up of the investment
advantages. The equilibrium strategy in period 2 corresponds directly to an all-pay auc-
tion with discrimination in the form of a head-start advantage, as analyzed by Konrad
(2002). Thus, in period 2, or the presidential election cycle, the parties do not take into
account themargin ofvictory, but instead cash-in on the built-upinvestmentadvantages.15
4.1 Discussion
Given Theorems 1 and 2 we now examine the qualitative nature of the equilibrium
campaign resource schedules and the optimality of the 50-state strategy. Proposition 1
examines the effects that contest asymmetry and the value of the state have on both
parties’ expected expenditures.
Proposition 1 In each period and in each state, the equilibrium expected expenditures
of the incumbent and challenger are both increasing in the value of the state (vj) and
decreasing in the investment advantage (at
j).











































It follows directly that the incumbent’s expected expenditure is increasing in the value











j < 0). Note that as the investment advantage a1
j decreases the race
in state j becomes more symmetric. That is, as the race becomes more symmetric the
incumbent’s expected expenditure increases.









































As with the incumbent, the challenger’s expected expenditure is decreasing in the in-
vestment advantage (dEF1
j,i(x)/da1
j < 0) and increasing in the value vj of the state
(dEF1
j,i(x)/dvj > 0).
For any given value of dr which satisﬁes Assumption 2 representative iso-expected
expenditures for the incumbent and the challenger are given in Figure 2 below. The
combinations of (vj,a1
j) that satisfy Assumption1 lie below the 45o line. The solid lines
correspond to level curves of expected expenditures, which are increasing as you move
southwest from any (vj,a1
j) ∈ R2
++ which satisﬁes Assumption 1.16
[Insert Figure 2]







j)2)/(2vj), and the period 2 expected expenditure in state j for the challenger is
EF2
j,i(x) = (vj −a2
j)2/(2vj). Clearly, both of these expressions are also increasing in
vj and decreasing13 in a2
j.
Proposition 2 examines the optimality of the 50-state strategy. Recall that the basic
argument for the 50-state strategy is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that
build the party up for future campaigns and, thus, strictly positivelevels of campaign re-
sources should be allocated to each of the states. Conversely, the basic argument against
the 50-state strategy is that “the way you build long-term is to succeed short-term” and
short-term success requires that you focus on the battleground states.
Since equilibrium in our model requires randomization at each stage, we may com-
pare the likelihood that a party chooses the 50-state strategy in the case that campaign
expenditures are durable outlays (period 1) and in the case that they are not durable
outlays (period 2).
Proposition 2 Regardless of whether or not campaign expenditures are durable out-









for t = 1,2.
In each state both advantaged and disadvantaged parties may rationally forgo allocating
resources to a state with positive probability. The likelihood that a party forgoes allo-
cating campaign resources to a state is increasing in its advantage, or disadvantage, in
that state. That is the battleground states, in which the parties’ are the most symmetric,
are the most likely to receive a positive level of resources. Since the randomization em-
ployed by a party in its equilibrium strategy is independent across states, the probability
of employing a 50-state strategy is simply the product of the respective probabilities of
allocating a positive level of the resource to each state j. The probability that each party
allocates a positive level of the resource to state j is (1−(at
j/vt
j)) for t = 1,2. Thus,
if parties behave strategically and optimize given the behavior of their rival, a 50-state
strategy is a seemingly unlikely outcome.
13 Note that Assumption 2 implies that a2
j < vj with certainty in any equilibrium real-
ization of a2
j.17
To summarize, equilibrium expected expenditures for both parties are increasing in
the value of a state and decreasing in the incumbent head-start advantage. The incidence
ofzero expenditureisidenticalforbothparties, increasingintheincumbencyadvantage,
and decreasing in the value of the state. States with no incumbency advantage receive
positive allocations with certainty from both parties regardless of the value of the state.
These predictions appear to be consistent with evidence appearing in Figure 1 and
Table 3 of Str¨ omberg (2008), which provide data on the parties’ presidential and vice
presidentialcandidates’post-conventioncampaignvisitsduringthe2000and 2004elec-
tions. As noted by Str¨ omberg, and also predicted by our model, large states with close
forecasted voteshares tend to receivealarger numberofcampaign visitsby bothparties.
Smaller states in which the parties are close in vote share are likely to obtain a smaller,
but positive, number of campaign visits from the two parties. Moreover, the data show
that, in both election campaigns, states with large forecasted vote share differences were
quite likely to receive zero campaign visits by both parties and that several states were
visited by one party but not the other.14 These data appear inconsistent with the model
examined by Str¨ omberg, who assumes an interior equilibrium in each state in which
the parties expend identical positive levels of the resource within the state.15 However,
the data appear consistent with our model, in which parties allocate zero resources to
a state with positive probability (unless the two parties contest the state symmetrically)
and, due to the equilibrium mixed strategies, generally allocate different levels of the
resource to a given state.
5 Conclusion
The standard argument for the 50-state strategy is that campaign expenditures consti-
tute a long-run investment that will build up the party for future election cycles. This
paper examines the optimality of this strategy in a simple intertemporal model of po-
litical campaign resource allocation with persistent campaign expenditures. The equi-
14 In the 2000 elections, 24 states received no post-convention visits by both parties’
candidates and two states received no visits by one party’s candidates. In the 2004 elec-
tions, 20 states received no post-convention visits by both parties’ candidates and 13
states received no visits by only one party’s candidates.
15 Str¨ omberg (2008)claims that in his modela uniqueinteriorpurestrategy equilibrium
always exists. However, it is easily veriﬁed that this is not the case for sufﬁciently small
variance of his state and national popularity parameters.18
librium in period 2 illustrates the standard short-run gains arguments against the 50-
state strategy. Each party plays a modiﬁed battleground-states strategy in which they
stochastically forgo allocating resources to states in which they are either advantaged or
disadvantaged and more highly contest the battleground states. In the ﬁrst period, par-
ties optimally utilize the persistence of campaign expenditures to invest in the period 2
campaign, at which time built-up investment advantages are cashed-in. However, even
in period 1 the basic structure of the modiﬁed battleground-states strategy arises. That
is, even with persistent campaign expenditures, the short-term electoral gains from fo-
cusing (stochastically) on the battleground states outweigh the long-term party building
gains from investing in all of the states.
Appendix
The following lemmas establish the uniqueness of the period 1 subgame perfect equi-
librium campaign resource allocation schedules for a1
j > 0.16 Let F
1
j denote the incum-
bent’s period 1 campaign resource allocation schedule in state j and let sj,I and sj,I




sj,C be similarly deﬁned for the challenger.
The ﬁrst two lemmas characterize the necessary conditions that arise in all of the
possible conﬁgurations of the lower bound of the supports.
Lemma (A.1) If sj,C < sj,I +a1
j then (1) F1
j is constant over the half-open interval
(0,sj,I +a1
j], (2) sj,C = 0, (3) F1
j(0) > 0, and (4) sj,I = 0.
Proof Recall that in period 1 when the incumbent spends sj,I in state j the effective
expenditure is sj,I +a1
j. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which sj,C < sj,I +a1
j.
For any campaign expenditure at or below sj,I +a1
j the challenger loses in state j with
certainty. Furthermore, the period 2 payoff is zero in any state which was lost in period
1. Thus, it is suboptimal for the challenger to choose any period 1 expenditure in the
half-open interval (0,sj,I +a1
j], where sj,I +a1
j is included due to the tie-breaking rule.
To demonstrate (2) and (3) note that if sj,C < sj,I +a1
j, then F1
j(0) > 0 since F1
j is
constant over (0,sj,I +a1
j].
To prove (4) note that F1
j is constant over the half-open interval (0,sj,I +a1
j]. Thus,
if sj,I > 0 the incumbent can increase his payoff by setting sj,I = 0. ⊓ ⊔
16 See Riley (1998) for the uniqueness argument with no head-start.19
Lemma (A.2) If sj,C ≥ sj,I +a1
j then (1) sj,I = 0, (2) F
1





Proof Suppose sj,C ≥ sj,I +a1
j. For any campaign expenditure below sj,C −a1
j the in-
cumbent loses in state j with certainty. As previously noted, the period 2 payoff is zero
in any state which was lost in period 1. Thus, it is suboptimal for the incumbent to
choose any period 1 expenditure in the interval (0,sj,C−a1
j).
For (1) and (2), note that if sj,C ≥ sj,I +a1
j, then sj,I = 0 and F
1







j is constant overtheinterval (0,sj,C−a1
j). Thus,if sj,C >a1
j the challenger
can increase his payoff by slightly lowering sj,C towards a1
j.
For (4), note that with any campaign expenditure at or below a1
j the challenger loses
with certainty. Thus, it is suboptimalfor the challenger to place positivemass on a1
j. ⊓ ⊔
Lemmas (A.1) and (A.2) provide the only two possible cases. The remaining parts
of the proof establish that it must be Lemma (A.1) that applies, sj,C < sj,I +a1
j, and that
in this case there is a unique equilibrium.
In the following lemmas we will restrict our attention to the case that the incumbent
does not choose a period 1 pure strategy that is large enough that the period 1 challenger
not only loses in period 1 but also drops out of the period 2 race. Earlier arguments in
the proof of Theorem 2 showed that Assumption 2 rules out the optimality of any such
strategies.
Lemma (A.3) sj,I = sj,C−a1
j.
Proof Suppose that the incumbent chooses to spend x1
j,I > sj,C −a1
j in state j. From










Since dr < 1, in any equilibrium the incumbent sets sj,I ≤ sj,C−a1
j.
Similarly, suppose that the challenger chooses to spend x1
j,C > sj,I +a1
j in state j.













Since dr < 1, in any equilibrium the challenger sets sj,C ≤ sj,I +a1
j. ⊓ ⊔
Lemma (A.4) Neither player i =C,I places positive mass on any strictly positive point
in the support of their campaign resource allocation schedule.20
Lemma (A.4) follows directly from Lemma 1 in Riley (1998).
Lemma (A.5) F1
j is strictly increasing over [a1
j,sj,C] and F
1
j is strictly increasing over
(0,sj,I].
Proof By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which F1
j
is constant over the interval [a,b) ⊂ [a1
j,sj,C] and strictly increasing above b in its
support. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that F
1
j is also constant over
the interval [a −a1
j,b −a1







j), then for any e > 0 spending b +e in state j cannot be
optimal for the challenger. Indeed, from Lemma (A.4) discretely reducing expenditure
from b +e to a +e would strictly increase the challenger’s payoff. Consequently, if F1
j
is constant over [a,b) it is constant over [a1
j,sj,C], a contradiction to the deﬁnition sj,C.
⊓ ⊔
The following two lemmas utilize the following properties of the equilibrium ex-
pected payoffs. Recall that for the incumbent the expected payoff in state j from using
any pure strategy x1
j.I contained in the support of the equilibrium strategy in period 1 is
Ej(p1
I )+dEj(p2





























Equilibriumpayoffs must be attained over the support of the incumbent’s strategy. From
Lemmas A.4 and A.5, the players randomize continuously on the intervals [a1
j,sj,C] and
(0,sj,I], respectively. Thus, differentiating (5) with respect to x1


































































for x ∈ [a1

















for x ∈ [0,sj,I] and constant K2.
Lemma (A.6) sj,C < sj,I +a1
j.
Proof By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which sj,C ≥
sj,I+a1
j. From Lemma(A.2), sj,C =a1
j and F1
j(a1
j)=0. Combining this with F1
j(sj,C)=































(A.2). That is, F
1
j (0) > 0 and consequently the conditions of Lemma (A.1) hold. ⊓ ⊔
Lemma (A.7) There exists a unique set K1, K2, and sj,C which forms an equilibrium.
Proof From Lemma (A.1), F1
j (0) > 0. Since the challenger earns an expected payoff
of zero by setting x1
j,C = 0, his expected payoff is zero for each point in the support
of his equilibrium campaign resource allocation schedule (except possibly at the point
x1
j,C = a1
j for which the incumbent has a mass point at 0). As x1
j,C converges to a1
j from
above, the challenger’s expected payoff converges to vjF
1
j (0)−a1


























































vj ) or equiv-
alently F1

















To complete the proof note that the K1, K2, and sj,C characterized in Lemma (A.7) result
in the unique equilibrium distributions given in Theorem 2, and from arguments made
in the proof of Theorem 2, it is suboptimal for either player to deviate from the support
of this strategy.22
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Fig. 2 Period 1 iso-expected expenditures for the incumbent and challenger